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guru/net-misc/graftcp/files/graftcp-local.initd-r1
T
zyxhere💭 3ed37b3ed5 net-*/*: stop exporting $pidfile in OpenRC service scripts (insecure)
Say it with me: the pidfile and its parent directories should
only be writable by root unless you use supervise-daemon ;)

With `checkpath -o someuser:someuser $pidfile` in start_pre(), it can
cause DOS attacks because the now unprivelaged process can replace the
pidfile with some other pid number in it like pid 1 and cause the host
machine to crash when the daemon finally stops. Supervise-daemon can
supervise without the daemon creating a pidfile so don't export the
variable at all.

That assumes the scripts *are* using supervise-daemon, if
supervise-daemon fails to start (due to maybe some incorrect config
option *wink wink*) then OpenRC falls back to the older
start-stop-daemon and that *does* use the $pidfile. If thats the case
then the daemon will simply fail to start (yes I haven't tested if any
these packages work without $pidfile which they should since they are
specifying `supervisor=supervise-daemon`).

IMO failing to start is better than running in a potentially vulnerable
configuration.

Merges: https://codeberg.org/gentoo/guru/pulls/92
Part-off: https://codeberg.org/gentoo/guru/pulls/92
Signed-off-by: zyxhere💭 <zyx@envs.net>
2026-09-30 12:19:39 +00:00

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#!/sbin/openrc-run
# shellcheck shell=sh
#
# Copyright 2025-2026 Gentoo Authors
# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
description="Translate TCP to SOCKS5 or HTTP proxy"
supervisor="supervise-daemon"
command="/usr/bin/graftcp-local"
command_args="\
-config ${GRAFTCP_CONFIG:-/etc/graftcp-local/graftcp-local.conf} \
-syslog \
-pipepath /run/graftcp/${RC_SVCNAME}.fifo \
${GRAFTCP_OPTS}
"
: "${command_user=graftcp:graftcp}"
depend() {
need net
use logger
}
start_pre() {
checkpath -d -o "${command_user}" /run/graftcp
}